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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
~fll!IE

URE BAKER,
Plaintiff,

vs.

RICHARD MILLS BAKER,
Defendant.

STATEMIDNT OF FACTS
This is an appeal from a decree entered in the
District Court of Weber County, State of Utah, on the
27th day of September, 1949·, finding the appellant in
contempt of court, modifying the decree entered between
the parties to the above entitled action on the 30th day
of June, 1948, and making other orders relating to the
rights of the above named parties and their two minor
children ( Tr. pages 062-063).
In the decree of divorce entered June 30, 1948, the
care, custody and control of Joan Carol Baker and Jean
Baker, the two minor daughters, then five and three
years of age respectively, were ayvarded to their mother,
the appellant, subject to the right of visitation of the
respondent at all reasonable times and places. The
respondent was ordered to pay to the appellant at the
office of the clerk of the court the sum of $50.00 per
month for the support and maintenance of each child,
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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or the total sum of $100.00 per month, payable $50.00
on the lOth day and $50.00 on the 25th day of each month
beginning with July, 1948 (Tr. 021-022).
A complete settlement of the property rights between the parties was made through an award of certain
property to the appellant, and she was given no award
whatever for alimony (Tr. 021-023).
In the pleadings for modification, reference is made
to alimony for the appellant, but that is a misstatement.
The hearing was conducted on the theory that all rights
between the parties were settled at the time of the
divorce, and the respondent was ordered to make payments for the support of the minor children only.
In the Findings of Fact and Decree as originally
entered, the Court found that the respondent is an able
bodied man capable of earning $300.00 or more per
month, and fully employed ( Tr. 018). In the findings
used as the basis for the decree and order herein appealed from, the court found that the respondent is
still employed and now receives take-home-pay of
$350.00 to $400.00 per month ( Tr. 095). In the respondent's ovm testimony given at the hearing for modification, he admitted that at the time of the hearing he
was earning approximately $400.00 per month (B. of
Ex. 5), and that the award for the support of the
children was based not upon the property owned by the
respondent at the time the decree was entered, but upon
his earnings (B. of Ex. 6). The-re was no claim that
the sum of $100.00 for the support of the two minor
children is more than they need, or that it constitutes a
2
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burden upon the respondent, \Yho has no other dependents. The elaim for reduction "~as made solely upon
the ground that the children had been taken to the state
of Oregon \\~here is \Yas difficult for the respondent to
Yisit them. There is no claim at all that the. welfare
of the children is not promoted through the change of
residence to Oregon, or is there any claim whatsoever
that the appellant is anything but a kind and exemplary
mother, fully deserving· of the custody of the children,
and one \\'"ho cares properly for the children. An additional fact is that the respondent at the time of the
filing of his petition for modification was admittedly
in arrears $350.00, and at the time the appellant cited
him into court he owed an additional $100.00. Furthermore, he had refused to pay $250.00 attorneys' fees and
costs in the sum of $56.20 awarded under the original
decree (B. of Ex. 10). There is no express provision
in the decree against the removal of the children from
the State of Utah. For findings in original action see
Tr. 017-018.
In the fall of 1948, the appellant sold her property
in Weber County and purchased property in Nyssa,
Oregon, where she could live in the same community with
and receive assistance from her sisters and daughters
(B. of Ex. 20 and 24). When the respondent failed to
make payments under the terms of the decree, the
appellant caused him to be cited into court and thereby
initiated the proceedings resulting in this appeal.
The court in the decree appealed from found the
respondent in contempt only because of his failure to
pay the $250.00 attorneys' fees and costs awarded under
the original decree, and permitted him to purge himself
3
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from contempt by paying the amounts due for attorneys'
fees and costs (Tr. 062-063). Although the respondent
was admittedly in arrears in the sum of $100.00 at the
time the appellant left the State of Utah and moved to
Oregon in November, 1948, and was in arrears an
additional $350.00 before he made any application· for
a modification of the decree, the court did not find him
in contempt on those items. However, the court found
the appellant in contempt for removing the children
from the State of Utah without the consent of the court,
and in effect fined her $350.00 and rewarded the respondent to the extent of $350.00 by holding that the
appellant could not collect the $350.00 past due and
unpaid at the time the respondent applied for modification. The court further reduced the amounts payable
to the children from $50.00 each to $30.00 each per month
and refused to modify the decree so as to expressly
give consent for the appellant to keep the children in
Oregon, although by implication such consent is found
in the decree. The reduction in effect is an additional
puntitive measure against the mother for taking the
children to Oregon.
STATEMENT OF POINTS RELIED UPON FOR REVERSAL OR MODIFICATION OF THE JUDGMENT
OF THE DISTRICT COURT.
It is the contention of the appellant that the court
erred in modifying the original decree herein reducing
the amount payable by the respondent for the support
of the children from $100.00 to $60.00 per month he~
cause no change of circumstances sufficient to warrant
said modification was shown. If anything respondent's
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earning power has improve~ since the entry of the original dec-ree. In the second place, the trial court erred
in holding the appellant in contempt because the record
does not sho\Y any intentional violation of a court order.
As a matter of fact, there \vas no e~press or direct order
of the court prohibiting or forbidding the removal of
the children from this state. In the third place, the court
erred in that it exceeded its jurisdiction in imposing the
penalty which 'vas levied against the appellant. In the
fourth place, the court erred in depriving the appellant
of her right to collect the accrued installments for the
support of the children, and allowing the respondent
to keep the money in question, and in hearing respondent on his petition for modification while he was in default under the decree. Furthermore, the court erred
by taking from the children the money awarded to them
under the guise of punishing the mother for contempt .
. The court erred in granting respondent relief for period
before respondent applied to court for modification, and
in not giving appellant an opportunity to purge herself
from contempt if she were in contempt. The court
further erred i~ refusing to modify the decree so as to
give the appellant the express right to change the
residence of the children to the State of Oregon when
it appears that the move was for the best interest of the
children.
The court erred in refusing to enter the findings
of fact, conclusions of law and decree submitted by the
appellant because they were the only findings, conclusions and decree supported by the evidence.
The court erred in rejecting the evidence offered
by the appellant concerning the unfitness of the respondent to be alone \\'ith the t\vo minor daughters.
4
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POINT I
THE COURT ERRED IN MODIFYING THE DECREE REDUCING THE AMOUNT OF MONTHLY
PAYMENTS TO BID MADE FOR THE SUPPORT
OF THE CHILDREN BECAUSE NO CHANGE IN
CIRCUMSTANCES SUFFICIENT TO WARRANT
MODIFICATION WAS SHOWN.
In Cody v. Cody, 47 Utah 456 at 469, the court held
that ''under the statute, when judicial action is properly
invoked, the court, as to orders which relate to alimony,
custody of children, and awards for their support, when
they are co-ntinuing and over which the court retains
a continuing jurisdiction, is authorized on a proper
showing to modify the decree in such particulars. But
a further essential to such relief, and which is univer·
sa.Zly agreed upon, is that there must be averments and
proof of a change of circumstances or conditions of the
parties ..
0

''

The Utah court enlarged upon this statement in
Chaffee v. Chaffee, 63 Utah 261, at 269, by holding
'' ... In 7 Std. Ency. of Proc. at Page 843, in speaking
of proceedings to modify a decree of divorce, it is said:
'A further essential to such relief which is universally
agreed upon is that there must be a change of- circum~
stances, or newly discovered facts to warrant such relief, or it cannot be granted.'
''In Shouler on Divorce (6th Ed.) Vol. 2, Sec. 1831,
the author says: 'Modification can only be ordered on
proof of change of conditions, as the decree is final as
to conditions existing at the tjme, and a slight change is
not enough to warrant modification.' ''
5
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Still again the Supreme l~ourt of U tab held in Rockwood Y. Rock"~ood, 65 Utah at 268 and 269, " ... The
duty of the father to support his children, if he is able
to do so, is imposed in this state by positive statute. It
would be his duty in any event if there were no statute
upon the subject. Defendant has not shown, either in
his affidaYit or eYidence, that he is less able now to
contribute to the support of his children than he was
\vhen the orig·inal dec.ree was entered. He has not shown
that the mother of the children is able -to support them,
and, even if he had, it is not clear that such fact would
alter the case. He has not shown that the children now
require less for their support than when the decree was
entered. In fact, the court will take judicial notice· that
the children are still mere infants, dependent entirely
upon someone else for their maintenance and support.''
The Rockwood case presented substantially the
same situation as the instant case. There is here no
showing of change in the circumstances that existed
at the time of the divorce decree except that the children are no longer in the state of Utah. The father's
earnings are now better than at the time of the decree.
The original findings 'vere that the ''defendant is
a strong, able-bodied man, capable of earning $300.00
or more per month (Tr. 018).
In the proceedings appealed from the respondent
testified and the court found that the "Defendant receives at the present time ''take home pay'' of approximately $350.00 to $400.00 per month, the amount varying" (Tr. 059).
Under the Utah decisions above cited it is clear
beyond question that this is not a case where change of
6
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circumstances will support a modification of the decree.
The modification is just an additional penal measure
used against the appellant to the substantial detriment
of the children.
POINT II
THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING APPELLANT
GUILTY OF CONTEMPT AND EXCE:EDED ITS
JURISDICTION BY IMPOSING THE PENALTIES
LEVIED AGAINST HER.
Obviously, a person must be guilty of some definite
act or omission before he can be found in contempt of
c.ourt. Then if a person is found in contempt, the
penalties imposed must be in accordance with law and
not arbitrary.
It is provided by statute in our state that "The
following acts or omissions in respect to a court of
justice or proceedings therein are contempts of the
authority of the court: . . . " (U.C.A. 1943, 104-45-1).
Thereafter are set forth acts or omissions which consti..
tute contempt. It is ne.cessary, under this statute, for
a person to have committed one of the acts required in
order to be guilty of contempt. Such ·a statute as this
is exclusive and it is a definite requirement for a contempt finding to be made that it be made on one of the
twelve subdivisions of this statute.
The only subdivision of this section which has any
application to the instant case is subdivision 5. It reads
as follows, to-wit: ''Disobedience of any lawful judgment, order of process of the court.'' The finding of
contempt on the part of the appellant is that she ''has

7
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wilfully deprived defendant of the right to visit with
his children at reasonable times and places, and has
rendered it impossible for defendant to see his said
children at or near his place of residence, or within this
state, since a date prior to November 25, 1948 . . . ''
Tr. 062).
There "~as no court order expressly prohibiting the
appellant from removing the minor children of the
parties from the State of Utah. The decree stated only
that the children •'Be and they are hereby awarded to
the plaintiff, subject to the right of visitation in the
defendant at all reasonable times and places" (Tr. 021).
She violated no "la,vful judgment, order or process of
the court'', therefore, when she took the children to
Oregon.
The same situation was before the Alabama court
in Ex Parte Vaughn, 87 So. 792. The divorce ·decree
awarded a minor child to the mother in these· words,
"It is further ordered, adjudged and decreed by the
court that the care, custody and control of William
··Dudley Vaughn ... he and hereby is given to the complainant, with the rig·ht of the respondent to see and
visit said child at such reasonable times and places as
will not interfere with the pr_oper control of said child
by complainant. . . . '' Both parties remarried. Complainant took the minor child to live in New York without getting a court order permitting her so to do. On
a petition by the respondent for custody of the child the
complainant demurred. The respondent had the demurrer stricken on the grounds that complainant was
in contempt for having taken the child out of the state
without a court order. The court held, ''Here the
8
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petitioner was awarded the custody of her infant child,
and given the right to again· contract marriage, with
nothing in the decree either directly or indirectly, prohibiting her living in other jurisdictions outside of the
state of Alabama, and the right of respondent to visit
the child was prescribed for such reasonable times and
places as would not interfere with the proper control
by complainant. It has been held that the charge of
contempt cannot he established for failure to comply
with uncertain orders or judgments. 9 Cyc. 11. We
think it very elear that petitioner here could not be
punished for contempt for disobedience of an order
of the court, as was allege<;l in the motion. . .
"Moreover, in cases of this character it must be
recalled that the welfare of the child is of paramount
importance, and it may be seriously questioned that a
parent when not in willful contempt should he deprived
of the right to interpose a defense as to its custody,
when brought into court for such purpose by the opposing parent. ''
The eourt here recognizes that the welfare of the
children of the parties is being best served by their being
in Oregon. Otherwise the court would have had no
choice but to have ordered them returned to its jurisdiction in Utah. No such order was made or requested.
Tacit recognition is given to our claim that the welfare
of the children is best subserved by the appellant in
continuing their presence in Oregon by the fact that
no finding was made that their welfare would be furthered through their return to Utah.
There is no violation of a court order involved in
the finding of contempt against appellant unless it be
9
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that the court found appella.nt g·uilty of contempt for
failure to allow respondent to visit the children in Utah.
The evidence on this point is to the effect that respondent made littl0 effort to see the children for substantial
periods of time (Tr. p. 21) and that vvhen he did come
his presence upset the children and ''made them nervous
and irritable', (Tr. p. 22). The \velfare of the children
once more would demand that they not be upset. Stability and confidence are needed by children · of their
ages and emotional upsets are clearly contrary to their
well-being. Furthermore, there could be no basis for a
finding of contempt while appellant resided in Utah
because there was no express order of the court violated
by appellant.
The viev~T that taking the children out of the state
of original jurisdiction without a court order, when
there is no express prohibition in the decree of divorce
against it, will not constitute contempt is given added
authority in the case of Barnes v. Lee, 275 P. 661, an
Oregon case. A divorce was granted in Oklahoma.
Custody of the child was awarded to the father subject to the right of the mother to visit the child at
proper times and places and also to have it visit her
for one month in each year during school vacation. The
father moved to Oregon and took the child with him.
The mother attempted to regain custody in Oklahoma
and got a court order in that court for custody. This
Oklahoma order \Vas then presented to the -Oregon court
asking that it be enforced, but the Oregon court said,
''There was not disobedience of the order of the Oklahoma court in Lee's con1ing to this state and bringing
the child with him, as long as there was no provision

10
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in the order that she was not to be taken from the state.
Concerning this feature in the case, i:p. Stetson v .. Stet·
son, 80 Me. 483, 485, A. 60, 61; it is said: 'That theresult of the decree may cause the removal of the child
beyond the limits of the state, is not of itself an objection.
This may be the effect in any case. Though the parent
receiving the custody may at the time be a resident
within the state, there is no authority, except in cases
of crime, to prevent an immediate removal.'
''Although the foregoing may be stating the rule
rather strongly, we are clearly of the opinion that,
unless either the terms of the decree or its necessaryimplications forbids the removal of the child from the
state, there is no violation of the order.''
In the instant case it would he necessary for the
court to torture words to the extent of saying that the
''necessary implications forbid the removal of the
child from the state'' in order to have grounds for a
contempt holding. That the right of reasonable visitation, as applied by the court of this state, goes that
far is straining far past the meaning of the words.
The annotation in 88 A.L.R. at 200 cites the case
of Campbell v. Campbell, 37 Wis. 206, as follows: "In
Campbell v. Campbell ... it was held that where the
judgment of divorce awarded the custody of the child
of the parties to the wife, reserving to the husband the
right to visit it once a week, but did not expressly prohibit the wife from taking the child to another jurisdiction for good cause did not constitute even a technical
contempt of court, and did not bar her from obtaining

11
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a modification of the decree for alimony in her favor
as proYided by ~tntute, Or from recovering the alimony
already accrued.''
This deci8ion i~ in line \Yith our thinking that the
right of reasonable Yisitation is not violated by the removal of the children from the state in the absence of
an express or implied order of the court not to remove
children from its jurisdiction, and that if they are removed there is no taint of contempt in the removal. The
removal of the children from the state in the instant
case 'Yas a reasonable exercise of the right of control
by the appellant. She acted as she felt the best good
of the children required (Tr. P. 20).
In the absence of an express provision in the divorce
decree or in the statutes of this state, it was not contempt of the court for the mother to whom custody was
awarded to remove the minor children awarded to her
from the jurisdiction. Even where such a practice is
frowned upon, the husband is not relieved of his duty
to support the children because they are no longer in
the state, and his right of visitation has been circumscribed. At common law and by statutory enactment
in many states it was and is the duty of the father to
support his minor chiidren.
The Supreme Court of l\Iichigan in Kane vs. Kane,
216 N. W. 438, pointed out the problem in saying, "Ac.cess to the child by the parent denied custody is an important right. It is recognized that awarding custody
to a non-resident parent may render the privilege of
visitation impracticable in many cases. That privilege
is not an absolute right, but one which must yield to
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the good of the child. Waldref v. Waldref, 159 N.W.
1068; Bedolfe v. Bedolfe, 127 P. 594; 19 C. J. 348. Its
feasible exercise should be safeguarded by the decree,
but only to the extent it may be done without opposing
the best interest of the child. Where the proofs are
convincing, the welfare of the child demands that course
be taken, its custody may and should be awarded to the
non-resident parent, not"\\rithstanding the effect may be
the defeat of visitation by the resident parent.
''That a father is deprived of access to his child by
a divorce decree does not relieve him from obligation
to support it. Whether he is refused the right of visitation because found unfit, or its exercise is obstructed
by permitting the residence of the child in a foreign
jurisdiction, he may nevertheless be charged with its
maintenance. A contrary rule would be preposterous.
It would mean _that a husband and a father, who applied
for and obtained a divorce in this state from his wife
residing with their child, in for example a country of
Europe, or against whom a divorce is granted on the
cross-bill of the nonresident wife is to be relieved of all
obligation to contribute to the support of the infant
unless it is brought aeross the ocean to facilitate his
right of visitation.''
In the instant case the court has found, for all intents and purposes, that it is proper for the appellant
to retain custody of the minor children and that this
c.an be done by retaining residenee in the state of
Oregon. Yet, the eourt also held that the appellant was
in contempt of court for having taken the ehildren to
the state of Oregon without a court order because the
removal of the children to the state of Oregon restricted
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the respondent in his rights of visitation. This proposition is '·preposterous'' under the doctrine of the Kane
case. If the 'Yelfar~ of the children is best served by
their continued residence in the state of Oregon, that
is the important matter for the court to consider. There
was no 'vilful intent on the part of the appellant to
disobey any court order in moving "'\vith her children
to Oregon (Tr. ~0). As a matter of fact, there was no
court order to prevent her from so removing the children.
''Unless the decree expressly or impliedly forbids
removal, there is no violation of the order by removing
the child from the state ... A father is not entitled to
have alimony payments suspended because the children
are outside the jurisdiction if he has no right to see the
children or if their welfare does not demand that they
be returned.'' 27 C.J.S. at 1180. So in this ease the
welfare of the children is best served by remaining in
the state of Oregon. On that there can be no dispute.
In the case of Altschuler v. Altschuler, 284 N.Y.S.
93 at 94, the court said, ''Order modifying an order entered August 19, 1934, punishing plaintiff for contempt
for failue to pay alimony, by eliminating therefrom the
provisions requiring· ·him to pay current alimony of
$30.00 a week during the time that his right of visitation
of the children is denied him, reversed on the law ...
The decree, as amended, provides that the plaintiff
have the right to visit his children at all reasonable
times and places. While the defendant, in removing the
children to California, violated this provision of the
decree, nevertheless the court was without power, on
this motion, to relieve the plaintiff from his obligation
to pay for the support and maintenance of his children
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until he first secured a modification of the final decree.
Dube v. Dube 245 N.Y.S. 287, Gibson v. Gibson, 143. N.
Y.S. 37."
Though the appellant were guilty of contempt, which
is not admitted, the court exceeded its authority in ordering that appellant he ''deprived of the right to enforce
payment by defendant to her of the sums accruing upon
support moneys, under the terms of such Decree, from
November 25th, 1948, to the end of February, 1949 ... "
( Tr. 062). There is error in three respects in this
order. First, the support money was for the support
and maintenance of the minor children of the parties
and not for the appellant, so that the order made by the
court withholding payment of $350.00 and reducing
monthly payments was a penalty on the children rather
than on the appellant. Second, the installments had
already accrued and the payment of them could not be
modified by the court. Third, the penalty imposed is
in direct violation of statute.
The first two errors are either self explanatory or
covered elsewhere in this brief. (Points I, II, III, IV,
and V)
"The law punishes the contemner out of no personal
consideration for the judge, or the litigant, but only
when the best ends of justice will be subserved thereby.
Punishment may be either punitive, to vindicate the
authority of the law, or remedial, to compel the performance of some order or decree which, although in
his power to perform, the person refused to obey, and
to accomplish its object punitive punishment for contempt may extend to acts of past disobedience.'' 13 C.J.
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at 86. The question is raised by this citation as to
'vhether or not ''the best ends of justice will be subserved'' by the punishment imposed by the court against
the appellant. ~ictually the appellant is not the one
punished. The t\YO minor children of the parties are
the ones on ''Thorn the burden of the punishment falls.
There has been a court order made in their interest
because of a need sho\\rn to exist for the support of the
children. They are the ones injured by the ruling of
the court in that support money on which they rely
for necessary subsistance has been taken from them
and the natural duty of the father to support his children, as recognized at common law and by statutes,. is
abrogated.
;.

The statutes providing for the punishment of contempt, U.C.A. 1943, 104-45-10 and 104-45-11, are exclusive
as to the punishment which can be imposed. They provide for three types of punishment, to-wit: a fine, imprisonment, or both fine and imprisonment, or, if an
actual loss or injury to a party prejudicial to his rights
is caused by the contempt, the court may, in addition to
the fine andjor imprisonment, order the person proceeded against to pay the aggrieved party a sum of
money sufficient to indemnify him for the loss suffered.
No other punishment is mentioned either directly or
indirectly. As is set 'forth in 12 Am. Jur. at 432, "Any
punishment set out in the statutes is exclusive . . . ''
That being so the court has exceeded its authority by
penalizing the appellant in a manner not authorized
under statute.
Furthermore, the maximum fine provided by statute
is $200.00 (Sec. 104-45-10 U.C.A. 1943).

16

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

POINT III
THE COURT ERRED IN DEPRIVING APPELLANT
OF THE RIGHT TO COLLECT PAST DUE INSTALLMENTS OF SUPPOR,T MONEY FROM THE
RESPONDENT AND IN HEARING RESPONDENT
ON HIS PETITION FOR MODIFICATION WHILE
HE WAS IN DEFAULT UNDE~R THE DECREE
The support and maintenance allowed to the appellant by the decree of divorce was solely for the benefit
of ·the minor children of the parties. Nothing was
awarded to the appellant in the form of alimony or support money. The court was without power in any way
to modify the original decree of divorce as to payments
of support past due. Yet the court in this case has
expressly ''deprived'' appellant of her legal right to
collect from the respondent that which was already
vested in her.
As set forth in 27 C.J.S at 1239, the law is, "Payments exacted by the original decree of divorce become
vested in the payee as they accrue, and the court, on
application to modify such decree, is without authority
to reduce the amounts or modify the decree with referenee thereto retrospectively, unless some reservation is
made in the decree itself; the modifying decree relates
to the future only and from the time of its entry.
Defendant's application to set aside order for main·
tenance of children or reduction of the award will not
be considered until he pays all arrears due the original
decree.''
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The lTtah Supreme
la"·· ~leyers
L.R. 74.

Y.

~!eyers,

l~ourt

has held that to be the
62 Utah 90, 218 P. 123, 30 A.

See also Adair vs. Superior Court (Ariz.) 33 P.
2nd 996: 19 C.J. 359; ·\v·assung vs. Wassung, 286 N.W.
349; Kell v. Kell, 161 N.W. 636; Delbridge v. Sears, 160
N.W. 218; Craig· v. Craig, 45 N.E. 155; Pottinger v.
Potting·er, 18:2 So. 763; Van Loon v. Van Loon, 182 So.
205; State v. Hall (Ore.) 55 P. 2nd 1105.
POINT IV
THE COURT ERRED IN TAKING FROM THE
CHILDREN THE ~IONEY AWARDED TO THEM
UNDER THE GUISE OF PUNISHING THE
MOTHER FOR CONTEniPT.
There is nothing in the decree in this action which
indicates that the payments for the support of the children are conditioned on the right of visitation awarded
to the respondent. The two rights are independent of
each other. The New Jersey case of Hatch v. Hatch,
192 A. 241, in such an action held that an order entered
in a divorce action requiring payments by a father for
maintenance of the child was not conditioned on the
right of visitation granted the husband in a decree where
custody of a child was a\Yarded. to the wife.
Nothing which \Ve have found in the Utah law makes
the two rights dependent on each other. Certainly the
right of visitation to a natural parent of children is
important. None will deny that. But more lln.portant
is the right of the children to have proper care. This
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cannot be given wit~out adequate financial assistance,
and that a~sistance in this case, as in most instances,
must come from the father, the respondent in this action.
The New Jersey court in the case of Feinberg v.
Feinberg, 66 Atlantic at qll held, "It is clearly contrary to the terms of Section 7 of the act concerning the
custody and maintenance of minor children (L.L. 1902,
p. 259) for defendant to remove the minor in question
out of the jurisdiction of this court, without first obtaining the consent of the petitioner or an order of this
eourt ·for that purpose. I am unable, however, to relieve against the payment of sueh moneys as have
accrued under the existing decree during the period in
'vhich no complaint has been made to the court touching
such removal. It is not the privilege of petitioner to
refuse payments accruing pursuant to the terms of the
decree. When nevv conditions arise, 'vhich in the opinion
of petitioner, entitle him to a modification of the decree,
he should make application to the court for such modification,~ if he desires to avail himself of rights arising
from the n,ew conditions.''
In the foregoing case the child was moved from New
Jersey to Pittsburg. No reduction in payments was
allowed as no changes in the condition of the parties
were shown except as to the convenience involved in
exercising the right of visitation. Utah has no statute
similar to that of New Jersey expressly forbidding the
removal of children a warded in a divorce action from
the state. The New Jersey court felt that even in the
face of such a direct la,v, the duty of the father to support the children was paramount. That is the only
reasonable conclusion to dra-\v. The daughters of the
parties in the inst~t case are too young to he left alone,
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and that makes it impractical. if not impossible, for the
appellant to obtain full time employment to support the
children. The duty of support rests with the respond~
ent regardless of the residence of the children.
In Zirkle Y. Zirkle, 202 Ind. 129, 172 N.E. 192, the
defendant ''as ordered, under the decree of divorce, to
make weekly payments to the plaintiff for the support
of their child, the custody of which had been given to
plaintiff. In that case, as in this one, the. defendant
had been given the right to visit the child at all reasonable times. In holding that the- fact that plaintiff had
removed the_ child to another state., thus depriving de~
fendant of his right of visitation, did not constitute a
defense to an action to recover the weekly payments,
the court said: ''It must he presumed that the order as
to custody and support of the child was made for the
benefit of the child. The child was and still is entitled
to have the order executed. The order has not been
modified or set aside. The decree did not provide that
the child should be kept in the state. It does not appear
that appellee (defendant) ever attempted to have the
order modified, or ever made any effort through the
court to have the child returned to the court's jurisdiction or to this state. If the appellant, without the
consent of the court, or without right, took the child
out of the state, that act did not give the appellee any
reason for refusing to make the weekly payments which
the court had ordered.''
To hold otherwise would he to punish children for
the errors of the parent over which they had no control.
A child must do as directed by the parent and cannot
dictate to the parent where the residence shall be.. The
20.
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child must· go with its parent.-custodian. Without a
choice in the matter there can. be no reason presented
to punish the child for any fault that might lie with a
parent in whose custody the child is.
The matter of the state of residence of the child is
not the question of fundamental importance. That which
is important is the well being of the child.
''In judicial appointments of custodians for children, the residence, actual or prospective, of the appointee,
is now a factor of minor importance-a subordinate
consideration. Although residence is ·not wholly ignored,
it has become, in modern times at least, altogether a
secondary element, influencing the court in deciding
whether or not to appoint an applicant. The primary
questions to be answered before that of residence arises,
when a child's custodian is to be named, relate to the
conservation and promotion of its interests; the safety
of its estate; its welfare and happiness in a changed
environment; the fitness, ability, and suitability of the
proposed custodian to be entrusted with the child's care,
education, and maintenance; the age, sex, and circumstances of the child, and the comparative claims of kinship to it among those from whom the choic.e of custodian
must be made. It is only when all these questions have
been satisfactorily answered in favor of the applicant
that the question of residence is considered by the court,
in the light of its advantages and disadvantages as a
dwelling place for the child. If, then, these are favorable,· the mere fact that the home is located outside of
the state seems to be immaterial.'' 20 A.L.R. 838.
A note in 88 A.L.R. at 200 states the law as followH:
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~~In

Helmbold v. Helmbold, 217 N.Y. Supp.
37!1, it was held that the failure of a wife to observe the provisions in a divorce decree in her
favor, relating to the right of the defendant to
see and Yisi t his children, was no excuse· for refusing to pay the alimony awarded, where the
payment of alimony ""as not made conditional
upon the observance of the provision in the decree in regard to the children. . The court said
that the defendant had a remedy under the decree
to compel observance of such provision, just as
the plaintiff might pursue her remedy to compel
the payment of alimony.''
The same citation further says:
''Thus, where a provision in an order for
alimony pendente lite, that the defendant husband
should be allowed to visit and see his child twice
a week during the pendency of the action in New
York, as might be agreed upon or as the court
should thereafter direct, was not made a condition precedent to the payment of the alimony
ordered, it was held in Schweig v. Schweig, 107
N.Y. Supp. 905, that the failure of the- plaintiff
wife to obey such provision w·ould not furnish justification for the nonpayment of the alimony and
counsel fee allowed, so long as the order remained unreversed.
•'As hearing on the possible distinction between the effect of a violation by the wife, of a
divorce decree, on her right to recover alimony
as such and her right to recover payments ordered to be made for the support of a minor child
or children, it is of interest to note that it was
declared in Thomas v. Thomas, 233 Ill. App. 488,
that, even if a mother were in contempt of court
for failing to comply with the provisions of a
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divorce decree whereby the father was to he allowed to visit the minor child placed in her custody, the father was ~till liable for the child's
support, and the court should compel the performance of such duty."
This last holding is just and equitable. Any other
ruling results only in the punishment of the children.

POINT V
THE COURT ERRED IN NOT GIVING THE PLAINTIFF AN OPPORTUNITY TO PURGE HERSELF
FROM CONTEMPT IF SHE WERE IN CONTEMPT.
The appellant asserts that there was no proper or
legal ground upon which the court order finding her in
.contempt can be based. However, if it he assumed for
the sake of argument that the appellant was in contempt by removing the children to the State of Oregon,
surely unless the court felt that the children were better
off in Oregon than they would be in Utah, it should
have directed their return to Utah.. The fact that the
respondent made no request to have the children returned to this jurisdiction, and that the court made no
order to that effect, show that in the opinion of the re·spondent and of the cou·rt the children were better off
where they are. If the court felt that the children
properly belonged in Utah, it should have directed their .
retu.rn to Utah, and have permitted the appellant to
purge herself from contempt by complying 'vith the
order to return the children. But the court gave the
appellant no alternative whatever. It took from her
and the children the $350.00 which had accrued and
which was payable a.t the time the respondent applied
for modification of the decree, and further reduced the
23
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sum payable for the support of the children from $50.00
each to $30.00 each per month "·ithout any showing
'vhate,·er that the amount of $60.00 is adequate for their
support, and in the face of the positive showing that
the $100.00 originally a"~arded is necessary. Again the
court did not give the appellant any opportunity to
avoid the penalty of that drastic reduction by returning
the children to Utah, or by doing anything else although
the reduction must be eonsidered as nothing but ·an additional penalty against the appellant and the children.
It is unprecedented for a court to make such fast and
hard orders without providing any means for the appellant and the children to escape the severe penalties imposed.
It will be recalled that the respondent while obviously in contempt was in effect rewarded for his
contempt by being permitted to retain $350.00 past due
support money, and although found in contempt for
his deliberate refusal to pay over $300.00 in attorneys'
fees and costs a\varded under the original deeree, he
wasn't even "slapped on the wrist", but was permitted
to purge himself merely by paying part of that which
he already owed.

POINT VI
THE COURT ERRED IN RIDFUSING TO MODIFY
THE ORIGINAL DECREE SO AS TO GIVE THE
APPELLANT THE EXPRESS RIGHT TO CONTINUE THE RESIDENCE OF THE CHILDREN IN
THE STATE OF OREGON.
24
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In her petition to the court the appellant expressly
requested that the decree be so modified as to permit
her to keep the children with her at her place of residence
.in Oregon (Tr. 044).
The evidence shows that it is for the best interests
of the children to remain in Oregon (B. of Ex. 19, 20,
23 and 24). There was no evidence at all introduced or
before the court indicating that the children are not
happy, well cared for and generally well situated where
they are now living. The whole theory of the respondent's case has no relation to the welfare of the children,
but relates only to his own desires and conve~ience.. It
is really based on his desire to escape the payment of
all support money.. That he is a harsh, domineering,
profane and vulgar man appears definitely from the
findings of the court in the original decree ( Tr. 017018).
Finding No. 4 made by the court in the original action
( Tr. 017) among other things set forth ''that frequently
and more or less continuously defendant has displayed
toward plaintiff a mean and disagreeable nature and disposition and a violent and explosive temper, and has
on occasion hit and struck plaintiff violently and in
anger without any provocation whatever, and has become angl"Y at the children of the parties hereto, and
has abused them with angry terms and bas on occasions
bit them without good reason and without justifiable
provocation; that defendant abuses plaintiff with vile
and obscene language and epithets, and curses and
swears at her and at the children; that the defendant
at times evidences to plaintiff a morose and sullen disposition; and at times defendant has threatened plain25
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tiff and the children \Yith 8Uch violence as to put plaintiff and ~aid children in g'reat fear and terror of the
defendant; that defendant dominates plaintiff and the
children and the house hold of the parties hereto or
seeks to dominate them; and insists on making all decisions of any consequence \Yith respect to plaintiff and
the home of the parties hereto, without consideration
of plaintiff's vie\YS and despite her protests or objections; that defendant assumes to,vard plaintiff an attitude of great superiority and arrogates to himself the
right to make all family determinations in· the full expectation on his part that his views should he carried
out unquestioningly.''
The appellant pointed out to the court that when
the respondent visited the children he made them nervous and irritable, and at times acted like a maniac (B.
of Ex. 2).
Furthermore, the appellant has disposed of all her
holdings in Utah, has established a home in Oregon, and
is able to carry on her home life more advantageously
with her children where she is now situated (B. of Ex.
17 et seq.).
The court,· of course, found in effect the children
should remain in Oregon by making no order that they
should be returned, but still left the appellant dangling
as to her position in the eyes of the court, under the
decree, through refusing to modify the decree so as to
permit the change of residence.

POINT VII
'£HE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO E;NTER
'rHE FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
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AND DECREE SUBMITTED BY THE APPELLANT
BECAUSE THEY ARE SUPPORTED BY THE LAW
.AND THE EVIDENCE AND THE FINDINGS, CON.CLUSIO.NS AND DECREE AS ENTERED ARE NOT.
The appellant submitted to the court after the hearing on the application for modification her proposed
findings of fact, conclusions of law and decree (Tr. 049·o55). The trial court rejected them in their entirety
and signed the findings, conclusions and decree as submitted by counsel for respondent after making t'vo
·.changes to correct some obvious mistakes in computation.
It is submitted that the findings and decree pro-·
posed by the appellant are in accordance with. the evidence and law in the case, and that the findings, conclusions and decree submitted by the respondent and
signed· by the court are not supported by the evidence
or by the law.
The 5th finding ( Tr. 059) is wholly immaterial to the
issues involved because it does not relate to the earnings of the respondent and does not show any change
of circumstances taken into consideration by the court
at the time the amount for support of the children was
·fixed.
Finding No. 4 (Tr. · 059) is not supported by the
evidence except as to the fact that the respondent now
earns $350.00 to $400.00 per month "take home pay".
There are. no facts and there is no evidence to support conclusions of law Nos. 1, 2, 3, and 4 (Tr. 060 and
061).
The decree is not supported by the evidence or by
the findings, and that part of the decree finding the
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appellant in contempt is void in that the court is without
jurisdiction and po"rer to impose the penalty provided
in the second paragraph of the decree (Tr. 062) .
. .\s argued in other parts of this brief, the decr~e
of the court is 'vholly in variance with the law.

POINT VIII
THE COURT ERRED IN REJECTING THE EVIDENCE OFFERED BY THE APPELLANT CONCERNING THE ~IOR.A.L UNFITNESS OF THERESPONDENT TO BE ALONE: WITH THE CHILDREN.
The appellant offered to prove that the respondent
ha"d made indecent advances toward a daughter of the
appellant by a former marriage, and had told the appellant's son by a former marriage that he was a fool
if he didn't have intimate relations with his sister, and
if the brother didn't the respondent would; that the
respondent further wanted to take indecent liberties
with his own infant daughters (B. of Ex. 34).
In the entire record in this case there is not an
iota of evidence that the appellant at any time has been
anything except a clean, wholesome, virtuous wife and
mother while the record abounds in evidence against
the fitness of the respondent.
The original case didn't go by default, hut was a
contested case, and the court's findings are based upon
an open airing of issues in court.
It is submitted that in a case involving the welfare of two infant girls the scope of inquiry as to the
fitness of a man like the respondent to be alone with
these little girls should be much greater than on ordinary occasions.
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CONCLUSION
In conclusion it is respectfully submitted that the
de.eree of the lower court appealed from cannot be upheld. There ·cannot be found in the record support
for the court's order reducing the amount of the payments for the maintenance of the children. The court
exceeded ~ts jurisdiction in refusing to permit the appellant to eollect the past due installments of support
money for the ehildren, finding the appellant in contempt and. imp·osing upon her excessive and unprecedented penalties. The court in effect punished the
children in whose welfare the appellant was acting, and
rewarded the respondent for h~s meanness and his wilful
refusal to comply wi~h the court decree. The court erred
in letting the respondent be heard at all until he had
paid into court at least all his past due delinquent installments under the original decree and erred in refusing· to give the appellant an opportunity to purge
herself from contempt if she were in contempt. It is
further submitted that the court erred in refusing to
put an express provision into t)le decree permitting the
ap·p~llant to retain the residence of the children in
Oregon; that the court erred in rejecting evidence
offered hy the appellant and in refusing to adopt the
findings of fact, conclusions of law and decree submitted hy the appellant.
It is respectfully submitted that the court should
reinstate the terms of the decree as they relate to sup..
_port and direet that the respondent pay the accrued sums
in full; that the decree should be modified so as to per-
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mit the children to remain in Oregon, and that the
appellant should be purged for the alleged contempt;
that the court should R\\yard to the appellant attorneys'
fees for prosecuting this appeal together with her
costs.
Respectfully submitted,
DAVID J. WILSON
of WILsoN & WILsoN,
Attorneys for Appellarnt
David Eccles Bldg.
Ogden, Utah
Appellant's Address
Nyssa, Oregon
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